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What’s at Stake in the Transition Debate? Rethinking the Origins of 
Capitalism and the ‘Rise of the West’ 
 
Alexander Anievas & Kerem Nisancioglu 
Introduction  
 
Recent years have witnessed a veritable historiographical revolution in the study of the early 
modern epoch. This has come from a disparate group of scholars1 challenging what they see as 
the fundamentally ‘Eurocentric’ nature of extant theoretical and historical approaches. Debates 
over the origins of capitalism have subsequently taken on new dimensions as scholars have 
forcefully problematized notions of an inextricable and self-propelling ‘rise of the West’ whilst 
relativizing the uniqueness of a singular Western modernity. Once side-lined to the margins of 
historical and sociological investigation, the non-Western sources, dynamics and experiences of 
capitalist modernity have thus been at the forefront of these literatures acting as a much needed 
corrective to the essentializing, self-aggrandizing narratives of an internally-generated ‘European 
miracle’.  
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this literature has been the resolute focus on 
the relations of interconnection and co-constitution between the West and ‘the rest’ in their joint 
making of the modern world. This attention to ‘the international’ as a thick space of social 
interaction and mutual constitution should put International Relations (IR) scholars in a unique 
position to make important contributions to these debates. Yet, thus far, postcolonial critiques2 
have made little impact on the mainstream of the discipline, even after the historical sociological 
                                                 
1 The body of anti-Eurocentric literature is now vast. For a sampling of some of the most important contributions 
see James Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993); A.G. Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age 
(Berkeley:University of California Press, 1998); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making 
of the Modern World Economy (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2000); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2000); John Hobson, The Eastern 
Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jack Goody, The Theft of History 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
2 But see the significant contributions by John Hobson, The Eastern Origins; Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, 
International Relations and the Problem of Difference (London:Routledge, 2004); Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The 
Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of International Studies 32 (2006):329–352; Robbie Shilliam (ed), 
International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity 
(London:Routledge, 2010); Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Historical sociology, international relations and connected 
histories’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23, no. 1 (2010):127–143; Sanjay Seth, ‘Postcolonial Theory and the 
Critique of International Relations’, Millennium, 40, no. 4 (2011):167-183.  
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‘turn’.3 Instead, historical sociological approaches to IR have been criticized with reproducing 
Eurocentric assumptions, as they predominately conduct their analysis on the basis of European 
history.4  
More recently, attempts to reconstruct Leon Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined 
development (U&CD) into a theory of ‘the international’5 have also been subject to the charge of 
Eurocentrism. For Gurminder Bhambra, despite attention to the implications of societal 
difference, U&CD remains tied to a stadial mode of production-based theory that still identifies 
the central dynamic of capitalism as European in origin. This essentially excludes the non-West, 
relegating it to an empirically significant yet theoretically secondary role. U&CD thus fails to 
‘address issues of domination and subordination…integral to the emergence…of unevenness’.6 
Similarly, for John Hobson: ‘invoking inter-societal processes as causal factors of social change is 
…insufficient …either because the ‘international’ turns out to be “intra-European”, or because 
when the international reaches global proportions, it is understood in terms of Western agency 
and Eastern passivity’.7 A further point of contention in these debates revolves around the 
spatio-temporal applicability of U&CD: whether or not the concept can be usefully extended in 
time and pace beyond the capitalist epoch. ‘For failure to generalise U&CD’, Hobson writes, 
‘leads to fetishising Europe with the unintended consequence of naturalising, if not eternalising, 
Western capitalist domination, while simultaneously denying agency to the East’.8  
This article seeks to take up these challenges, engaging with anti-Eurocentric critiques in 
developing a more ‘international’ approach to the origins of capitalism that, as Bhambra puts it, 
‘brings the non-West more thoroughly into understandings of the construction of the modern 
world’.9 It does so by building upon U&CD in developing a distinctly non-Eurocentric account 
of the genesis of capitalism thus generalizing the concept beyond its original capitalist 
                                                 
3 Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (eds.) Historical Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge:Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
4 Cf. Hobson, The Eastern Origins; Bhambra, 'Historical sociology’. 
5 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Why is There no International Historical Sociology?’, European Journal of International Relations, 12 
no. 3 (2006):307-340; Kamran Matin, ‘Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International 
Relations of State-formation in Premodern Iran’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 13, no. 3 (2007):419-
447; see also Neil Davidson, ‘Putting the Nation Back into the International’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
22, no. 1 (2009):9-28; Jamie Allinson and Alexander Anievas, ‘Approaching the “international”: beyond Political 
Marxism’, in ed. Anievas Marxism and World Politics (London:Routledge, 2010):197-214. 
6 Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Talking Among Themselves? Weberian and Marxist Historical Sociologies as Dialogues 
without Others’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39, no. 3 (2011):673,676. 
7 John Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in the Neo-Trotskyist Debate? Towards a Non-Eurocentric Historical Sociology of 
Uneven and Combined Development’ Millennium, 40, no. 1 (2011):153. 
8 Ibid,165.  
9 Bhambra, ‘Talking Among Themselves?’,669.  
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temporality. U&CD is uniquely suited in offering a genuinely ‘internationalist historiography’10 of 
the origins of capitalism by theoretically incorporating the interactive and multiform character of 
all social development. 
The debate on the transition to capitalism is a particularly apposite body of literature for 
assessing U&CD’s efficacy in theorizing social change because positions within it well 
demonstrate the very methodological problems U&CD seeks to overcome: specifically, the 
hardened division between ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ modes of explanation. In particular, the 
debates within (neo-)Marxist approaches have largely split between these two ‘internalist’ and 
‘externalist’ poles. On one side, scholars such as Maurice Dobb,11 Robert Brenner12 and Ellen 
Wood13 locate the generative sources of capitalist social relations in the internal contradictions of 
feudal European societies. On the other side, Paul Sweezy14 and Immanuel Wallerstein15 view 
capitalism as having developed from the growth of markets and trade in Europe16 over the Long 
Sixteenth Century (1450-1650). The main issue between these different positions thus revolves 
around whether the intensification of exchange relations (trade) or class conflicts were the ‘prime 
movers’ in the transition to capitalism. Anti-Eurocentric scholars have broadened the debate in 
considering the emergence of antecedent forms of capitalism (or ‘protocapitalism’) in the non-
West while further emphasizing the overwhelmingly ‘contingent’ or accidental factors explaining 
the rise of a globally dominant Western European capitalism.17 Yet, for the most part, the anti-
Eurocentrics move within the main methodological parameters set out by the original debate, 
accepting an essentially ‘externalist’ explanation of the origins of capitalism by highlighting the 
spread of commerce and markets as the ‘prime movers’.18 Nonetheless, what they have done, in 
creative and interesting ways, is to spatially decenter the causes of capitalism by moving away from 
the Eurocentric frameworks characterizing both sides of the earlier debates.  
                                                 
10 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2010),253.  
11 Maurice Dobb Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York:Taylor & Francis, 1963). 
12 Robert Brenner, ‘Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,’ in The Brenner 
Debate, eds. Aston, T. H. et al (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
13 Ellen Meiksins Wood The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London:Verso, 2002).  
14 Paul Sweezy, ‘A Critique’ in Rodney Hilton (ed) The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London:Verso, 
1978),33-56.  
15 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Volume I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World 
Economy in the Sixteenth Century (London:Academic Press, 1974). 
16 Here and throughout the paper the term ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ is deployed with the problematic implications 
of anachronism and intra-European divisions firmly in mind. As such it is used, unless specified, in a basic 
geographical sense, predominantly (but not exclusively) denoting England, France, Low Countries, Portugal, 
Hapsburg Spain and Austria, Germanic principalities, Hungary, and Italian city-states.  
17 See, for example, Jack Gladstone, ‘The Rise of the West or Not? A Revision to Socio-economic History’, 
Sociological Theory 18, no. 2 (2000):173-94; Pomeranz, The Great Divergence; Hobson, Eastern Origins of Western 
Civilization, 313-316.  
18 Cf. Frank, ReOrient; Hobson, Eastern Origins of Western Civilization.  
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 So what exactly is Eurocentrism? At its core, Eurocentrism represents a distinctive 
mode of inquiry constituted by four interrelated assumptions about the form and nature of 
modern development.19 First, it conceives the origins and sources of capitalist modernity as a 
product of developments primarily internal to Europe. Dominant accounts of the rise of 
capitalism either as an economic form20 or as a social system21 place its origins squarely in 
Western Europe, while non-Europe is relegated to an exploited and passive periphery.22 This 
posits a strong ‘inside-out’ model of social causality (or methodological internalism) whereby 
European development is conceptualized as endogenous and self-propelling.23 Europe is thereby 
conceived as the permanent ‘core’ and prime mover of history which, in its worst forms, can 
lend itself to an interpretation of European society/culture as somehow superior to the rest. This 
second, normative assumption of Eurocentrism can be termed historical priority. 
From these two assumptions emerges a third predictive proposition that the European 
experience of modernity is a universal stage of development through which all societies must 
pass. European modernity is a kind of public good to be given to other societies through some 
form of diffusion. This entails a fourth stadial assumption, linear developmentalism, whereby 
endogenous processes of social change are conceived as universal stages of a linear development 
which encompass all societies of the world at different times and different places. These four 
assumptions (methodological internalism, historical priority, universal stagism, and linear developmentalism) 
make up the core of Eurocentricism.24  
The following article challenges these assumptions by examining the extra-European 
geopolitical conditions conducive to capitalism’s emergence as a distinctive mode of production.25 
We do so by tracing the subaltern processes of societal transformation through an analysis of 
three spatio-temporal vectors of U&CD emerging over the late Medieval and early Modern 
epochs. This is not intended to be a ‘total’ account of the origins of capitalism. Rather, the article 
aims to specify particular geopolitical factors that were fundamental and necessary (but not 
sufficient) conditions for the advent of capitalism in Western Europe. 
                                                 
19 This follows the summary by Matin, Kamran, ‘Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of 
Eurocentrism’, European Journal of International Relations, iFirst (2012): 2. 
20 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Are Some So Rich and Some So Poor? (London:W. W. Norton 
& Co., 1998). 
21 Robert Brenner, ‘Agrarian Class Structure’. 
22 Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Volume I. 
23 Here, the partial exception is Wallerstein’s account which incorporates the American discoveries as a factor in the 
rise of a capitalist world system. But see John Hobson’s critique of World System Theory as Eurocentric in The 
Eurocentric Conception of World Politics (Cambridge:University of Cambridge, 2012),236-8.  
24 However, this is not to argue that every Eurocentric account shares all four assumptions.  
25 We define capitalism as a distinctive mode of production characterized by the systemization of competitive 
accumulation primarily based on the exploitation of wage-labor.  
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This article is developed in five movements. It begins by offering a critique of arguably 
the most influential (if controversial) interpretation of capitalism’s origins: the ‘Brenner thesis’. 
Demonstrating the problematically confining temporal and spatial limits of Robert Brenner’s 
‘capitalism in one country’ approach, we argue for a more robust conception of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ allowing one to visualize the intersocietal contexts of capitalism’s emergence. The 
second section lays out our alternative theoretical framework drawing on the concept of U&CD, 
explicating its core tenets of the ‘whip of external necessity’ and ‘privileges of backwardness’. 
The third section, then, examines the emergence of the Pax Mongolia as providing propitious 
geopolitical conditions for the increase in trade and commerce linking the West and East 
together as interactive components of a unified geopolitical system. Further, it elucidates how the 
Black Death, spread from East to West through the intersocietal interactions facilitated by the 
Pax Mongolia, led to decisive shifts in the balance of class forces eventually giving rise to 
capitalist social relations in Northwestern Europe, particularly in the English countryside. 
 Section four analyses how Ottoman attempts at Empire building curtailed the imperial 
threat of the Habsburgs, giving Northwestern European states the geopolitical space in which 
modern developments could take place. In the process, the Ottomans unwittingly facilitated the 
development of English agrarian capitalism and brought about a structural shift to Atlantic trade 
and Northwest European dominance. Section five details the effects of the New World 
discoveries in the rise of capitalist social relations in Northwestern Europe, demonstrating in 
particular the development of specific social forces in England, tied to colonial trade and 
planation production, that would play a decisive role in the making of the English ‘bourgeois 
revolution’.  
 
The Spatio-Temporal Limits of Brennerism 
 
In what has become one of the most influential theorisations of capitalism’s origins (Marxist or 
otherwise), Robert Brenner mobilised Marx’s emphasis on changing social property relations in 
order to construct an account of the origins of capitalism in terms of class struggles specific to 
feudalism.26 These struggles were bound in the specificity of social property relations based on 
the appropriation of surplus from the peasantry by lords through extra-economic means, where 
lords would habitually ‘squeeze’ agricultural productivity by imposing fines, extending work and 
extracting higher proportions of surplus. In the fifteenth century this sparked class conflicts in 
                                                 
26 Robert Brenner, ‘Agrarian Class Structure’, and ‘The Agrarian Roots of Capitalism,’ in (eds) The Brenner Debate. 
Aston, T. H. et al (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987),213-328. 
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the English countryside, where serfs rebelled against their worsening conditions and won formal 
enfranchisement. The liberation of serfs from ties and obligations to the lords’ demesne initiated 
a rise in tenant farming and led to increased market dependence as peasants were turned away 
from their land and forced into wage-labour as an alternative means of subsistence. Although 
peasant expulsions were met with significant revolt, the unity of the English state and nobility 
ensured victory for the landed ruling-class.27 This concentrated land in the private possession of 
landlords, who leased them to free peasants, unintentionally giving rise to ‘the classical landlord-
capitalist tenant-wage labour structure’.28  
Hence, for Brenner, the specificity of the feudal ‘system of surplus extraction’ 
determined the ‘uniquely successful development of capitalism in Western Europe’.29 Yet in spite 
of the extensive and informative historical explanation conducted by Brenner, the above 
formulation is conceptually too narrow and too simple; Brenner ultimately tries to explain too 
much with too little. In Brenner’s schema, Marx’s master concept, the ‘mode of production’—
conceived as the composite totality of relations encapsulating economic, legal, ideological, 
cultural and political spheres—is reduced to the much thinner ‘social properly relations’ concept 
itself reduced to a form of exploitation. Brenner’s error is to take the singular relation of 
exploitation between lord and peasant as the most fundamental and axiomatic component of the 
mode of production, which in turn constitutes the foundational ontology and analytical ‘building 
block’ upon which ensuing theoretical and historical investigation is constructed. Consequently, 
as S.H. Rigby notes, Brenner is one of those ‘Marxist theorists’ who ‘constantly slip toward an 
implicit pluralism by which Marxism dies the death of a thousand qualifications’.30  
The result of this ontological singularity is a dual tunnelling – both temporal and spatial – 
of our empirical field of vision and enquiry. Temporally, the history of capitalism’s origins is 
reduced to the historical manifestation of one conceptual moment – the freeing of labour – and 
in turn explained by it. Such tunnelling cannot account for why the extensive presence of 
formally free wage-labour prior to the sixteenth century (both inside and outside England) did 
not give rise to capitalism elsewhere.31 Nor can it explain subsequent social developments; by 
obliterating the histories of colonialism, slavery and imperialism, Brenner ‘freezes’ capitalism’s 
                                                 
27 Brenner, ‘The Agrarian Roots’,252. 
28 Brenner, ‘Agrarian Class Structure’,47. 
29 Robert Brenner, ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism’ New Left Review, 
104 (1977):94-103,68. 
30 S.H. Rigby, Marxism and History: A Critical Introduction (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2nd Ed, 1999), xi.  
31 Subhi Y. Labib, ‘Capitalism in Medieval Islam’, The Journal of Economic History, 29, No. 1 (1969):79-96; Jairus Banaji, 
Theory as History (Chicago:Haymarket Books, 2011). 
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history.32 This substantially narrows Marx’s more robust conception of the process of so-called 
‘primitive accumulation’ that Brenner and his students give so much analytical weight in 
explaining capitalism’s origins. In a famous passage, Marx wrote:  
 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the expiration, enslavement and entombment in mines 
of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, 
and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things 
which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the 
chief moments of primitive accumulation….The different moments of primitive accumulation can 
be assigned in particular to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England, in more or less 
chronological order. These moments are systematically combined together at the end of the 
seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the 
modern tax system, and the system of protection.33  
 
Here, we see the much more temporally and spatially expansive conception of capitalism’s 
emergence that Marx provides. The story of capitalism’s genesis was not then a national 
phenomenon, but, rather, an intersocietal one.  
In contrast, Brenner spatially reduces capitalism’s origins to processes that occurred solely 
in the English countryside; towns and cities are omitted, Europe-wide dynamics are analytically 
active only as comparative cases, and the world outside of Europe does not figure at all. Similarly 
excluded are the numerous technological, cultural, institutional and social relational discoveries 
and developments originating outside of Europe that were appropriated and adopted by Europe 
in the course of its capitalist development.34 In short, Brenner neglects the determinations and 
conditions that arose from the social interactions between societies: ‘“political community” is 
subordinated to “class” while classes are themselves largely conceptualised and studied within 
the empirical spatial limits of the political community in question’.35 Accordingly, within this 
spatio-temporal tunnelling we find the various moments of Eurocentrism outlined in the 
introduction. Temporal tunnelling gives rise to the notion of historical priority; spatial tunnelling 
gives rise to methodologically internalist analysis. For Brenner’s followers, these problems are 
only compounded as the possibility of early capitalist developments outside of the English 
countryside that Brenner allows for are rejected.36 The notion of the origins of ‘capitalism in one 
country’ is thus taken literally.  
                                                 
32 James, M. Blaut, ‘Robert Brenner in the Tunnel of Time’, Antipode, 26, no. 4 (1991):351-374. 
33 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I (London:Penguin, 1990),915. 
34 Cho-yun Hsu ‘Asian Influences on the West’ in Carol Gluck and Ainslie T. Embree (eds.) Asia in Western and 
World history: A Guide for Teaching (New York:M. E. Sharp, 1997), 22-31,27fn2; Hobson, The Eastern Origins,190-219; 
Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake’. 
35 Kamran Matin, ‘Democracy Without Capitalism: Retheorizing Iran’s Constitutional Revolution,’ Middle East 
Critique, 21 no. 1 (2012):37-56. 45 
36 Brenner views capitalist property relations as emerging in such regions as Catalonia and the United Provinces in 
the late 15th and 16th centuries, respectively, though he has not reflected on how these developments might 
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Unevenness and Combination  
 
To better account for the biography of capitalism’s development, we need to have an approach 
that captures the geopolitically interconnected and sociologically co-constitutive nature of its 
emergence. The theory of uneven and combined development provides one such approach. The 
below offers a schematic exposition of the theory’s two main concepts – unevenness and 
combination – from which the ‘whip of external necessity’ and ‘privilege of backwardness’ 
necessarily follow.  
Unevenness posits developmental variations both within and between societies, along with 
the attendant spatial differentiations between them. The ‘force of uneven development’, Trotsky 
wrote, ‘operates not only in the relations of countries to each other, but also in the mutual 
relationships of the various processes within one and the same country’.37 Emphasizing the 
specificities of any given society’s development, Trotsky showed how they were irreducible to 
any single unilinear path of development. ‘Russia stood not only geographically, but also socially 
and historically, between Europe and Asia’.38 As both cause and effect of this international 
differentiation, unevenness also denoted the peculiar local sociological forms of internal 
differentiation in institutional, cultural and class relations.39 For example, Trotsky noted both the 
imbalances between Russian town and countryside40 and between state and society41 in contrast 
to European forms. Crucially, such relations of unevenness created competitive structural 
conditions between societies themselves – ‘the whip of external necessity’ which in Trotsky’s 
case referred to the competitive pressures of European capitalism on the less-developed Russian 
social formation.42 Hence, developmentally differentiated societies constantly impact upon one 
another’s social reproduction and development, which in turn instigate various forms of 
                                                                                                                                                        
problematize his theoretical account of the origins of capitalism which exclusively focuses on the English 
countryside. Other scholars within the Brenner School have, by contrast, viewed the origins of capitalism as an 
exclusively English affair, rejecting the possibility of the antecedent development of capitalism in the Low Countries. 
See Robert Brenner, ‘The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 1:2 (2001):169-
241; Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘The Question of Market Dependence’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 2:1 (2002):50-87; 
Charles Post, ‘Comments on the Brenner-Wood Exchange on the Low Countries’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 2:1 
(2002):88-95.  
37Trotsky, Permanent Revolution,131. 
38 Trotsky, History,26. 
39 Luke Cooper, ‘Uneven and combined development in modern world history: Chinese economic reform in the 
longue durée of capitalist modernity.’ Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, 
1 – 4 April 2012,6. 
40 Trotsky, History,474. 
41 ibid.,476. 
42 ibid.,28,477. 
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combined development. Social development is thus ineluctably multilinear, polycentric and co-
constitutive by virtue of its very interconnectedness.  
Combination at the most abstract level refers to the way in which internal relations of any 
given society are determined by their relations with other developmentally differentiated 
societies. For example, in Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, we find numerous processes 
through which the more ‘backward’ Russia attempted to developmentally ‘catch up’ with a more 
advanced Europe by making use of their pre-existing developmental achievements. The 
‘privilege’ of Russia’s backwardness entailed a ‘skipping over intermediate steps’43 of 
development, ensuring attempts at catch up did not follow the same paths of antecedent 
developments.44 Accordingly combined development also referred to processes in which 
societies drew ‘together different stages of the journey’, combining the spatio-temporally 
variegated experiences of societies into potentially explosive amalgams of ‘contemporary and 
more archaic’,45 thus creating multilinear trajectories of development. Hence, contra Bhambra’s 
criticism that U&CD theoretically reproduces the strong stagism of Enlightenment thinking, it 
rather presupposes stagism in order to scramble and subvert it. The notion of ‘stages’ is deployed 
precisely to counter stagist thinking as Trotsky continually emphasized in his many diatribes 
against the Menshevik position that the socialist revolution had to wait for the bourgeois stage to 
complete itself.  
 Though usually rooted in the interlacing and fusion of differentiated modes of 
production, the effects of a combined development suffuse every aspect of society. It is much 
more than a simple economic phenomenon, but, rather, captures the totality of relations 
constitutive of a social order. By deploying combined development in this way, Trotsky was able 
to uncover the contradictory and complex ‘concentration of many determinations’ that ultimately 
led to a trajectory of development in which proletarian revolution took place in Russia – 
economically the most backward and ideologically the most reactionary European state. 
Historical processes are, then, always the outcome of a multiplicity of spatially diverse nonlinear causal 
chains that combine in any given conjuncture. What this compels historians and sociologists to do 
methodologically is to analyse history from a multiplicity of spatio-temporal vantage points –
what we have termed elsewhere the overlapping ‘spatio-temporal vectors of uneven and 
combined development’46 – in order to uncover these causal chains. In this schema, Brenner’s 
                                                 
43 Ibid.,27,476. 
44 ibid.,27. 
45 ibid.  
46 Alexander Anievas, ‘1914 in World Historical Perspective: The “Uneven” and “Combined” Origins of the First 
World War’, European Journal of International Relations, (forthcoming, 2012). 
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emphasis on the origins of capitalism would constitute one of many spatio-temporal vectors of 
U&CD; one that must be complimented and combined with other determinations analysed from 
alternative vantage points. In short, U&CD stresses, indeed necessitates, an ‘internationalist 
historiography’47 of the origins of capitalism. 
  
Structural Crisis, Conjunctural Catastrophe: Pax Mongolia as a Vector of Uneven and 
Combined Development 
 
It is worth recalling that in the early modern epoch, Europe was in no sense predetermined to 
rise to global prominence. Up until at least the mid-13th century, the social formations making up 
‘Europe’ were the least developed region of a ‘world system’ of increasing economic integration 
and cultural contacts between ‘East’ and ‘West’.48 Arising late on the periphery of this world 
system, European development had the most to gain from the new intersocietal links being 
forged, particularly through the diffusion of new technologies and ‘resource portfolios’ spreading 
from East to West.49 The principles of mathematics, navigational inventions, arts of war, and 
significant military technologies all originated in the more advanced East eventually passing to 
the backward West.50 In these ways, Europe benefitted from a certain ‘privilege of 
backwardness’51 which was a key precondition for the eventual emergence of capitalism within it. 
Crucial to this process of worldwide interconnection was the ‘globalizing’ dynamic of the 
robustly expansionist Mongol empire which, over the course of the 13th and 14th centuries, 
unified much of the Eurasian landmass putting ‘the termini of Europe and China in direct 
contact with one another for the first time in a thousand years’.52  
The impact of the Mongol conquests in the subsequent trajectory of world history was 
profound. Once relatively isolated entities, the different sedentary and nomadic societies making 
up the whole of the Eurasian landmass were now ‘interactive components of a unified system’53 
of geopolitical relations. What we then find in the 13th century world is a plurality of 
differentiated societies, based on different modes of production (tributary in the East, nomadic 
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in the steppes, feudal in Europe), constituting a single interactive geopolitical whole. Within this 
ontological whole, each society’s conditions of existence necessarily impinged on and entered 
into their logics of reproduction thereby creating an ‘interdependence…of the structures of 
social, material and cultural life’.54 Nomadic expansionism thus represented a kind of ‘simple’ or 
archaic form of ‘uneven and combined development’.55 
The effects of the Mongol conquests on West and East were, however, gravely different. 
For China, the Mongol invasions profoundly arrested economic development. E.L. Jones claims 
that the human destruction wrought by the Mongol conquest of Sung China ‘was so large that it 
must have obliterated economic life over wide areas’.56 Similarly, according to Alan Smith, ‘after 
the overthrow of the Sung dynasty by the invading Mongols in 1276, China never regained the 
dynamism of its past’.57 For this reason, Eric Mielants cites the Mongol conquest as an 
‘important variable’ in explaining why China failed to make the transition to capitalism.58 
Although by 1350 the Mongol empire disintegrated into a number of rivalling khanates, the 
continuing nomadic threat to China’s inner Asian land frontier persisted. The strategic dilemma 
posed by the nomads is often cited as a reason for the Ming dynasty’s retreat from the sea 
represented by their famous decision not to follow up Admiral Zheng He’s naval expeditions in 
the Indian Ocean. The inward turn of the Ming Empire, though often exaggerated, nonetheless 
did signal the abandonment of seaborne expansion and, as an indirect result, the eventual 
weakening of the empire vis-à-vis its soon to be Western competitors.59 Had it not been for 
China’s central strategic problem, the nomadic threat, it may well have reached the New World 
first.  
 By contrast, for Western Europe, which only narrowly escaped Mongol decimation, the 
effects of the Mongol invasions were primarily beneficial for economic development. ‘Western 
merchants benefited tremendously, both directly and indirectly, from the Pax Mongolia “which 
had created a favorable political circumstances [for] the economic expansion of the West”’.60 In 
addition to lowering commercial protection and transaction costs of overland trade, the Mongol 
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Empire also facilitated the diffusion of such key technologies as navigational techniques and 
gunpowder61 from East Asia to Europe—all of which were crucial to the West’s subsequent rise 
to global prominence.  
Of particular significance for our discussion here was the ways in which the 
establishment of the Pax Mongolia was a major boon for overland trade connecting East to 
West, again notably benefitting Western Europe. As Janet Abu-Lughod has shown, the great 
contribution of the Mongols to the ‘world economy’ of the time was ‘to create an environment 
that facilitated land transit with less risk and lower protective rent. By reducing these costs they 
opened a route for trade over their territories that, at least for a brief time, broke the monopoly 
of the more southerly routes’.62 For a time, then, the creation of the Mongol Empire actually 
contributed to the processes of urbanization and spread of market relations already taking place 
throughout Europe. The decreased transaction and protection costs resulted, as Meilants puts it, 
‘in an unprecedented expansion of the market for Western European cities, which in turn 
increased the division of labor in most of the European urban industries’. ‘Thus’, as he 
continues,  
 
it is Eurocentric to claim that ‘medieval development’ in Europe was nothing but ‘auto-
development’. The opening up of the East Asian market due to the Pax Mongolia was of an 
unprecedented scale and provided enormous opportunities for the Western city states. The 
expansion of the textile industry in the Low Countries, for example, was intrinsically linked with ‘the 
increased demand for woollen cloth in interregional and international commerce’.63  
 
As Europe economically expanded, China lay in ruins: another reason for the divergent paths of 
socio-economic development between the two regions. Further, the integration of the 
Mongolian Empire had the unintended consequence of leading to ‘the unification of the globe 
by disease’64 as represented by the spread of the Black Death in the middle of the 14th century.  
The Black Death is often cited as a major conjunctural factor in both explaining the 
terminal crisis of the feudal mode of production in Europe and the crucial shifts in the balance 
of class forces leading to the eventual rise of capitalist social relations. Some scholars have gone 
so far as to cite the Black Death as the main reason for the development of capitalism in Western 
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Europe.65 Yet rarely, if ever, does this contingent factor enter into the theorization of the process 
of systemic dissolution and reconstruction itself. And, one might ask, why should it? How could 
any historical sociology theorize such a phenomenon? The reason is that in both origin and effect 
the Black Death was a social phenomenon. It is ‘indicative’, Neil Davidson writes, ‘of a rather 
oversocialized notion of human existence if our struggle with…non-human aspects of nature is 
treated as an exogenous factor’. Davidson goes on to give the example of the Black Death 
which, he correctly notes, plays a crucial role in Brenner’s explanation of the changing balance of 
class forces at the end of the 14th century. Against conceptions of the Black Death as a pure 
contingency, however, Davidson notes how ‘the extent of its [the Black Death’s] impact was a 
function of the weakened resistance to disease of a population who were already suffering from 
reduced caloric intake as a result of the feudal economic crisis’.66 What is more, it was only 
through the Mongolian unification of the Eurasian landmass, and the increasing intersocietal 
interactions that this facilitated, that allowed the Plague to spread to Europe in the first place.67 
The integration of the Mongolian Empire thus had the unintended consequence of creating what 
Le Roy Ladurie called ‘the unification of the globe by disease’.68 This is then a case of 
intersocietal interaction (‘combined development’) having massive, long-term social and 
economic impacts in the trajectory of European development feeding into the causal conditions 
for capitalism’s eventual emergence. For the demographic collapse resulting from the plague 
temporarily tipped the balance of class forces in favour of the peasantry throughout much of 
Western Europe, but notably within the English countryside.69  
In the face of labor shortages caused by the plague and the consequent upward pressures 
on wages levels, the ruling classes throughout Europe sought to reimpose strictures on the 
peasants that had been hitherto gradually diminishing, thus attempting to strengthen serfdom. 
This was a near uniform response of the ruling classes to a universal problem: a ‘seigniorial 
reaction’ to the structural crisis within feudalism (exhibited by the tendency towards a declining 
rate of seigniorial levy70) and the conjunctural catastrophe represented by the Black Plague. ‘In a 
system where the social reproduction of the ruling class hinged upon a growing population in 
order to sustain seigneurial revenues’, Jason Moore writes, ‘the Black Death quickly transformed 
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the agrarian depression of the early fourteenth century into a terminal crisis of the feudal 
system’.71 Where seigniorial reaction was successful, however, depended on the balance of class 
forces and antecedent processes of internal differentiation. As Findlay and O’Rourke note,  
 
In each region the impact effect of the plague was to raise wages, lower land rents, and hence 
increase the demand on the part of landowners for serfdom. The different experiences of 
Eastern and Western Europe must therefore be due to differences in the ‘supply’ of serfdom, 
with rulers in the former region more willing to accede to landowners’ demands more than 
their counterparts in the latter. Trade and population recovery favoured urban interests in 
the west and rural interests in the east.72 
 
The central reason for these different outcomes lay in the variegated relations between land and 
labour in Eastern and Western Europe. Although the demographic collapse in Eastern Europe 
was actually less in absolute terms than that in the west, the strain was greater given the already 
endemic shortages of labor characterizing the region. ‘Given the vast underpopulated spaces of 
Eastern Europe’, Anderson remarks, ‘peasant flight was an acute danger to lords everywhere, 
while land remained potentially very abundant…The land/labour ratio thus in itself solicited the 
noble class towards forcible restriction of peasant mobility and the constitution of larger 
manorial estates’.73  
According to Brenner, the key factors in explaining the different effects of the 
demographic collapse lay in the dynamics of the class struggle explicable by: (a) the differential 
levels of peasant organization, class consciousness and internal solidarity within each society, 
and; (b) the differential levels of ruling class unity and their relationship to the state.74 In other 
words, the key variables explaining the variegated effects of the demographic shifts caused by the 
Black Death (a result of intersocietal interactions) was the unevenness in the social forms of 
internal differentiation – particularly between the peasant and lordly classes in agrarian 
production on the one hand, and that between the lords and the state, on the other. It seems 
then, that ‘unevenness’ and ‘combination’ played a central role in the ending of serfdom in 
Western Europe thus paving the way for the subsequent emergence of capitalist production 
relations.  
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Crucially, for Brenner these variables explain the divergent developmental paths taken by 
England (towards agrarian capitalism) and France (strengthening of feudalism) in the aftermath 
of the Black Death. In France, the monarchical state developed a ‘class-like’ character, thus 
emerging as a competitor to the lords for the peasants’ surplus. This meant that when peasant 
revolts occurred the state would habitually support them against landlords, by protecting their 
freehold and fixing dues. The consolidation of peasant freedom precluded market forces of 
compulsion emerging in agrarian relations leaving France a fundamentally feudal state. In 
contrast, England developed significant unity among the landed class vis-à-vis each other and 
with the state, so that when peasant revolts took place the state fell on the side of landed 
interests. This allowed English landlords to maintain landholdings by ‘engrossing consolidating 
and enclosing’ peasant freeholds, leading to the development of market forces in production and 
emergence of symbiotic relations with tenant capitalists; in short, presaging the sustained 
economic development of agrarian capitalism.  
Remarkably, Brenner cites a distinctly international determination – the Norman 
Conquests of the eleventh century – as the causal factor behind England’s intra-lordly 
cohesion.75 But nowhere does Brenner’s treatment of this external determination enter into his 
theorisation of the development of agrarian capitalism, appearing instead as an ad hoc 
addendum.76 Without theorizing the international, Brenner finds no trouble tracing English 
nobility-state relations in sixteenth century to an eleventh century cause. Spatial tunnelling in theory 
thus leads to temporal tunnelling of history, where historical conjunctures are explained by 
phenomena half a millennia apart. This leaves questions over how far this picture of intra-lordly 
unity stands up when tested against the history of the intervening years. What, for example, 
explains the fits of English intra-lordly struggle during the Hundred Years War or the War of the 
Roses? The next section seeks to address this deficiency by looking at how England’s internal 
ruling class unity was in fact predicated on its relative seclusion from the geopolitical tumult that 
gripped Europe in the aftermath of the Black Death. Although such insulation from geopolitical 
factors would, at first sight, lend itself to the internalist method practiced by Brenner, on closer 
inspection we find that England’s isolation had distinctly international roots. 
 
The Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry over the Long Sixteenth Century 
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As the Mongolian horde ebbed back into Inner Asia, a geopolitical vacuum in Anatolia was filled 
by the Ottoman Empire. Starting as a small ‘tribe of 400 tents’77 on the border of Byzantium in 
the thirteenth century, it grew through perpetual conquest into an Empire that by the sixteenth 
century stretched from Basra to Belgrade, Cairo to the Crimea. Linking the Mediterranean to the 
Black Sea and Anatolia to Europe, this paved the way for a Pax Ottomana that greatly 
contributed to the revival of European commerce and connections with the East following the 
Mongolian retreat,78 feeding into the cultural flowering of the Renaissance in the process.79 
Geographically and economically, ‘the Ottoman Empire was the hinge that connected the rapidly 
growing economies of Europe with those of the East.’80  
Despite the regenerative effects of Pax Ottomana, for most of Europe the Ottoman 
incursions seemed like a semi-apocalyptic event.81 With a standing army the size of which no 
alliance of European princes could match, the Ottomans constituted a formidable military 
danger that threatened the very existence of Christendom. This Euro-Ottoman confrontation 
was rooted in a relation of unevenness: the Ottoman tributary system allowed for the raising of 
armies on a stable and unified basis, while in comparison, the feudal system in Europe required 
extraordinary financing for armies which weakened intra-ruling class unity and rural stability.82 
The very efficacy of the Ottoman military meant that from the mid-fifteenth century and ‘[u]p to 
1596 there was no question of international politics which did not somehow involve the 
Ottomans’.83 
This involvement was permanent and regularly hostile. In 1453 the Ottomans conquered 
Constantinople, subsequently using it as a base to conduct further excursions into Greece, 
Bosnia and Albania. By 1519, concern for the ‘Terrible Turk’ loomed so large that the election of 
Charles V as the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was in part based on his ability to unite 
Christendom in wars against the Ottomans.84 Europe’s Eastern preoccupation was soon justified 
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as Ottoman armies surged onward to Budapest and Vienna in the 1520s, putting them in direct 
conflict with the Habsburgs. The ensuing wars between these two ‘superpowers’ were conducted 
primarily on the South Eastern terrain of Europe, with an especially long drawn out war over 
Hungary and Mediterranean possessions. Teeming with Ottoman sponsored corsairs, access to 
this crucial artery of seaborne trade became increasingly conditional on outcomes of Ottoman-
Habsburg rivalry. 
Aside from these ‘direct’ instances of geopolitical pressure, the Ottomans made extensive 
use of alliances and connections with dissident groups in Europe as a means of undermining 
Habsburg hegemony.85 Francis I, King of Valois France, recognised the significance of the 
Ottoman Empire as a ‘power-balancer’, candidly admitting:  
 
I keenly desire the Turk powerful and ready for war, not for himself, because he is an infidel 
and we are Christians, but to undermine the emperor’s power to force heavy expenses upon 
him and to reassure all other governments against so powerful an enemy.86  
 
Around the same time, Sultan Suleyman I established links with the Schmalkalden League of 
German Protestant princes, urging them to co-operate with France against the Habsburgs, and 
going as far to offer them amnesty should Ottoman armies conquer Europe.87 The Ottoman 
threat in South East Europe eventually forced Charles V to grant German Protestants 
concessions in return for military and financial support in the Hungarian wars, contributing to 
the development of the Reformation.88 The Ottoman-Protestant axis would reach as far as the 
French Calvinist party, who implored the use of an Ottoman alliance against Spain in the second 
half of the sixteenth century. With less success, the Ottomans also attempted to develop links 
with the Moriscoes in Spain89 and Protestants in the Low Countries90 in order to internally 
destabilize Habsburg Spain. In these ways, Halil Inalcik notes, ‘the Ottoman Empire played an 
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important role in the balance of power in Europe in the sixteenth century and consequently in 
the rise of the nation-states in the West’.91 
Both Charles V’s and Phillip II’s prioritisation of the Ottoman front came at an 
extremely high cost. The former could not maintain either religious or Austro-Castillian unity, 
and the latter oversaw the eventual breakaway of the Dutch Provinces that would mark the 
beginning of the end for the Spanish Habsburg epoch. Indeed, it was only after the Ottoman 
threat was dispelled from the Mediterranean that Phillip II could concentrate Spanish efforts in 
consolidating rule in the Netherlands and invading England in the late sixteenth century, by 
which time it was arguably all too late.92 Various authors have noted that it was an accumulation 
of such ‘cross-pressures generated by the heterogeneity and scale’93 of the Habsburg domain that 
prevented the establishment of a unified imperial hegemony in Europe.94 In numerous ways it 
was the Ottoman threat that so persistently redirected Habsburg resources away from the 
internal divisions that were stretching the Empire to the North West, contributing in turn to the 
perpetuation of ‘multiple polities within the cultural unity of Christian Europe’ that ‘time and 
again frustrated universal imperial ambitions’.95 It could be said then, that the uneven and 
combined development of relations between the Ottomans and Europe created further 
developmental unevenness throughout Europe. 
In preventing the unification of Europe, the Ottomans thus created the geopolitical 
breathing space for the political and economic development of England and the Netherlands. 
The Dutch made use of the divisions in Christendom to take its long desired opportunity to 
break away from Habsburg domination.96 The English were perpetually buffered from European 
geopolitical pressure precisely at a time when the continent was experiencing a demographic and 
commercial revival. The Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry formed a geopolitical centre of gravity that 
consumed every corner of Europe, redirecting any imperial concerns away from England and the 
Low Countries. And typical of Ottoman manoeuvres, both states were offered diplomatic 
agreements – capitulations97 – that weaved political alliance with commercial privileges in 
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Ottoman territories. This was a major contributing factor to the integration of Levant and 
Atlantic trade in the seventeenth century and the ensuing rise of these Atlantic commercial 
powers. The Dutch became dependent on the Ottomans for supplies of their most heavily 
demanded raw materials – mohair yarn and wool – and equally dependent on the Ottoman 
market for one its principle exports, woollen cloths. England became similarly attached to both 
the import of wool from and export of woollen manufactures to the Ottoman Empire. In both 
cases, the attempts of merchants and financiers to monopolise and control such trade led to the 
establishment of strong trading companies.98 
Aside from these new commercial privileges, the effects of the Ottoman geopolitical 
buffer were especially pronounced in English intra-lord class relations and the peculiar 
development of the English state. A variety of authors have stressed the significance of 
England’s lack of involvement in continental geopolitical conflicts from 1450 onwards as a 
fundamental factor in its peculiar development of capitalism.99 Skocpol suggests that ‘England 
could remain somewhat aloof from the continental military system’ which made it ‘uniquely 
responsive to commercial-capitalist interests’.100 For Braudel this isolation abetted a highly 
beneficial protectionism helping England ‘remain independent and to fend off interference from 
foreign capitalists… more successfully than any other European country’.101 For Sayer, England’s 
privilege of isolation meant it was not ‘squandering productive resources on Continental empire 
building, nor obliged, to the same degree or in the same ways as Continental powers, to defend 
itself against others' expansionist predilections’ during the precise period when agrarian 
capitalism was set to take hold.102 
Isolation was significant to the development of capitalism for two reasons. Firstly, in the 
absence of the socially disturbing effects of invasion, English society was peculiarly homogenous. 
Such a feature precipitated an unprecedented internal social coherence in language, customs, law, 
and ultimately, a market that would become so central to capitalist development.103 Secondly, the 
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absence of warfare begot one of the more peculiar features of Tudor ‘absolutism’ – its relative 
lack of military resources. In contrast to the Habsburgs, Spain, France, or indeed the Ottomans, 
who were engaged in near permanent warfare, England had little requirement for a large army.104 
Concomitantly, there was no parallel development of the strong, tax appropriating bureaucracies 
that distinguished French and Spanish absolutism.105  
This had significant consequence for the relationship between the landed class and the 
state. Unthreatened by forces abroad and reluctant to engender monarchical centralization, the 
English aristocracy was significantly demilitarized: ‘In 1500, every English peer bore arms; by 
Elizabeth's time, it has been calculated, only half the aristocracy had any fighting experience’.106 
This in turn gave the English ruling class significant ‘freedom’ to pursue commercial activities, 
well in advance of any other European state.107 To begin with, the English state did not have the 
resources to protect the lower classes from attempts by the landed class to ‘engross, consolidate 
and enclose’ peasant land.108 But, moreover, demilitarization meant that the English landed class 
did not possess the sort of extra-economic power required to coercively ‘squeeze’ peasants, 
becoming instead dependent on their productivity.109 Under these conditions the English 
aristocracy became disassociated from ‘patented peerage’. Influence and office became a more 
important source of power for this ‘untitled gentry’ that would come to dominate English 
political and economic life.110 The English landowning class was thus ‘unusually civilian in 
background, commercial in occupation and commoner in rank’.111 The lack of social 
stratification engendered an intersection of landed classes, would be capitalists, and state officers 
that became a central plank of the landlord – capitalist tenant – wage labourer triad.  
These factors help to explain two ‘central elements’ of the Brenner thesis: firstly, why 
English society was so conducive to the landed class–capitalist tenant symbiosis that 
underpinned agrarian capitalism; secondly, why the nobility and state developed such mutual 
interdependence in England. As we have seen, these were products of England’s isolation from 
continental conflicts, itself explained by the Habsburg preoccupation with Ottoman incursions in 
Europe. When considered in this specifically international context, the two central elements of 
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the Brenner thesis can be best understood as forms of ‘combined development’ – the peculiar 
developmental outcomes of an inter-societal condition rooted in the differentiated – that is 
uneven – relation of England to the European geopolitical milieu. 
Another major consequence of Ottoman pressure would eventually feed into these 
English developments. Imperial expansion had brought under Ottoman control the main trade 
route that connected Europe to Asia. In accordance with the exigencies of their military aims, 
the Ottomans sought to break down the dominance of Genoese, Venetian, Spanish and 
Portuguese traders in Levantine markets, while simultaneously granting privileged access to 
occasional allies, the French, English and Dutch. Subsequently, merchants and financiers from 
blockaded states sought alternative routes to the East, with Genoese merchant-financiers 
redirecting capital away from the Mediterranean into commercial activity in the Atlantic. 
According to Mielants, ‘it was precisely the inter-city-state competition for access to Eastern 
markets and the threat of the expanding Ottoman Empire that led to the discovery of the 
Americas’.112 The uneven and combined development of Euro-Ottoman relations thus played a 
central role in bringing about a structural shift away from the geopolitical centrality of the 
Mediterranean towards the Atlantic.  
  
The Atlantic Sources of Western Capitalism 
 
‘…the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the 
New World as its pedestal’.113 
 
There is a long tradition in Marxist thinking emphasizing the profound impact the 1492 
‘discoveries’ had on the development and consolidation of capitalism as a world system. Yet, 
today, the hegemonic Brennerite approach to the origins of capitalism, emphasizing as it does 
the internal, agrarian sources of its genesis, explicitly sidelines the contribution of the ‘periphery’. 
Noting some Marxists’ emphasis on the importance of the wealth amassed from the New World, 
Ellen Wood writes, ‘we cannot go very far in explaining the rise of capitalism by invoking the 
contribution of imperialism to “primitive accumulation” or, indeed, by attributing to it any 
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decisive role in the origin of capitalism’.114 As reasons, she cites the relatively late start of British 
colonization and Spain’s failure to develop in a capitalist direction.  
 Regarding the latter, the immediate effects of colonialism on the Spanish Habsburg 
Empire were indeed to further entrench the feudal monarchy whilst arresting economic 
development in the region. Yet there were also significant knock-on effects that actually worked 
to hasten the rise of Dutch capitalism. While colonial surpluses were able to (partly) finance the 
Habsburgs military expeditions across Europe, ‘the influx of bullion from the New World also 
produced a paratism that increasingly sapped and halted domestic manufacturers’.115 This led to a 
virtual ‘de-industrialization’ of the Castilian economy as the home market collapsed with 
American silver raising production costs and an ascendant Dutch manufacturing sector 
penetrating the Castilian textile market. This further meant that Phillip II’s imperial projects 
could only be sustained through ‘reckless borrowing’.116 Thus, despite (or because of) the vast 
imports of New World silver, fiscal-military pressures bankrupted the monarchy eight times by 
the end of the 17th century.117And, as Genoese bankers held Spain’s public debt, they came to 
‘reorient their “surplus capital” from the American trade towards the bond market, thereby 
opening the door for Dutch capital. The rise of the United Provinces and the decline of Spain 
were therefore intimately connected’.118 What is more, the inflow of silver may have actually 
accelerated the decline of Spanish military power. For, as William McNeil notes, ‘it was the 
swelling flow of New World silver after the 1550s that made Philip [II] think he could conduct 
war both in the Mediterranean against the Turks and in the north against the Dutch’.119 New 
World silver thereby further aided the structural geopolitical space opened to Northwestern 
Europe (and particularly the Dutch) in advancing towards capitalism. 
The relationship of America’s colonization to the development of capitalism in Western 
Europe is, then, not as a straight-forward as Wood would have us believe. For one thing seems 
clear; without New World colonialism and slavery, capitalism wouldn’t have been able to survive 
nor catapult itself into the global industrial system that it subsequently became. As Robin 
Blackburn writes, ‘[t]he oxygen required by the European furnace of capitalist accumulation, if it 
was not succumb to auto-asphyxiation, was supplied by the slave traffic and the plantation-
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related trades’.120 The point Blackburn makes is particularly important if one views the origins of 
capitalism not as a single moment of inception, as does Wood, but as a value-added process of 
increasing systemic consolidation and complexification; a cascading and multilayered 
transformation of states and societies. So how did the colonization of the Americas contribute to 
this process of capitalist consolidation?  
In the first instance, the bullion confiscated in the Americas lubricated the circuits of 
capital accumulation within Europe as a whole, providing the liquid specie for Europe’s vibrant 
trade with the East. By 1650, the flow of precious metals from the Americas reaching Europe is 
estimated to have amounted to at least 180 tons of gold and 17,000 tons of silver. Between 1561 
and 1580, about 85% of the entire world’s production of silver came from the Americas. This 
provided the capital for European merchants’ profitable trade with Asia and East Africa in 
textiles and particularly spices.121 It also assisted European states in obtaining more raw materials 
and primary products from areas (particularly in China and India) which would have otherwise 
had little incentive to trade with the Europeans on such a scale.122 Moreover, as S.M.H. 
Bozorgnia notes,  
 
In due time, the influx of silver, coupled with the high value placed on this specie in the East, 
enabled Europeans to monopolize the trade of Asiatic countries and subordinate their economies, 
thereby laying the foundations of European domination and colonialism in the region. This 
domination ultimately enabled the Europeans to [channel] wealth and resources from every corner 
of that continent back to Europe.123  
 
The plundering of the Americas thus functioned as a central means of so-called primitive 
accumulation on a European wide basis. For throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain and 
Portugal acted as conduits for the transfer of much of the American bullion into the coffers of 
financiers in London, Amsterdam, Paris and Genoa. It is perhaps no coincidence that almost 
half of the gold and silver acquired by Spain ended up in Holland,124 the first state to experience 
a bourgeois revolution, ending up Marx’s ‘model capitalist nation of the seventeenth century’.125 
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Moreover, as Blackburn’s study shows, the slave system generated both the markets and needed 
surpluses that assisted in jumpstarting the engine of industrial accumulation while supplying key 
inputs into the industrial process.126 Though the slave system did not invent capitalism it did 
assure ‘the further development of an already existing agrarian and mercantile-manufacturing 
capitalist complex’ as ‘[t]he colonial and Atlantic regime of extended accumulation allowed 
metropolitan accumulation to break out of its agrarian and national limits and discover an 
industrial and global destiny’.127 Indeed, the Atlantic trade and colonial demand in particular were 
major stimulants to the industrializing British economy.128  
Another significant contribution to the development of capitalism that the American 
colonies provided was their use as sites of capitalistic experimentations in agro-industrial 
techniques as witnessed in the emergence of plantation slave complexes. The plantations are 
perhaps best characterized as ‘transitional forms’ of production relations combining complex 
hybrids of capitalist and pre-capitalist relations that, through their enmeshment within the world 
market, facilitated the rise of capitalism in the metropole in important ways. Blackburn describes 
them as ‘dependent and hybrid socioeconomic enterprises, not animated by a pure capitalist logic 
but closer to it than European serfdom and slavery would have been, or were’.129 
The slave plantations represented ‘combined’ social formations amalgamating different 
modes of production in particularly time-compressed ways. Sidney Mintz characterized the sugar 
plantations as ‘precocious cases of industrialization’ noting how these ‘agro-industrial enterprises 
nourished certain capitalist classes at home as they were becoming more capitalistic’.130 Indeed, we can 
trace the ways by which the colonial plantations of the ‘periphery’ were generative of precisely 
those social forces in the ‘core’ that would end up making a decisive contribution to consolidating 
England’s capitalist transition. Here we reconnect to Robert Brenner’s work detailing the role of 
the merchant community in the making of the English Revolution of 1640-60 which presents 
‘the metropolitan face of the hybrid economic forms whose development the other side of the 
Atlantic is traced by Blackburn’.131 
Brenner delineates two distinct factions of mercantile capital: one dominant faction 
centred around the City and increasingly tied to the East India Company and merchants 
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importing from the Levant, and; a second faction of ‘new merchants’ predominately coming 
from outside the City and connected to the rising colonial trades in the Americas. While the 
former faction relied heavily on the Crown for politically protected trade routes and monopolies, 
the latter was much less dependent on the state since, given the merchants’ socio-economic 
backgrounds, they were excluded from government-sanctioned charter companies. ‘Whereas the 
company merchants’, Brenner writes, ‘continued to maintain themselves on the basis of property 
that remained to a significant degree politically constituted, and systematically to avoid 
involvement in production, the new merchants not only initially traded without state-backed 
commercial privileges but were obliged to become profoundly involved as capitalist 
entrepreneurs in colonial production…’.132 It was this second faction of colonial mercantile 
capitalists, whom had begun the process of subsuming labour to capital, that would come to play 
a leading role in supporting Oliver Cromwell and the Independents during the Revolution. The 
balance of class forces in England was, then, directly connected to and constituted by socio-
economic developments in the New World thereby paving the way for England’s bourgeois 
revolution.  
 
Conclusion 
   
By extending U&CD beyond capitalism, we have sought to show its more general applicability as 
a theory of ‘the international’ whilst remaining sensitive to the massive qualitative differences 
between its capitalist and pre-capitalist iterations. U&CD represents a truly transhistorical 
phenomenon, yet its distinct causal determinations, articulated and expressed through 
intersocietal relations, are in every instance historically specific to, and variable across, any given 
mode of production. Under the generalized commodity production of the capitalist epoch 
U&CD tends to take on a more intensive and dynamic character.133 Wider developmental 
differences between societies generate more exaggerated causal determinations – the ‘whip of 
external necessity’ – that creates intersocietal ‘coercive comparisons’.134 This breeds a form of 
combined development in which adoption, substitutionism and hence amalgams of the 
‘contemporary and more archaic’ social forms are systemic features of the capitalist mode of 
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production. In the case of pre-capitalist societies, U&CD’s characteristics are qualitatively 
different. Due to the limited productive capabilities of pre-capitalist societies and the narrower 
developmental differences between them, the ‘whip of external necessity’ is less severe. 
Consequently there is no systemic tendency towards coercive comparison. To be clear, this is not 
to say that ‘combined social formations’ never existed in pre-capitalist times, but rather that their 
occurrences were qualitatively different: irregular and episodic. As our historical argument has 
demonstrated, even in the pre-capitalist context, the intersocietal conditions of unevenness still 
generated causal determinations that decisively impacted upon – that is combined with – the 
development of social formations.   
From the Mongol invasions to the New World Discoveries, we have traced how 
geopolitical developments led to the geographical linking of hitherto disparate communities, 
creating a truly global history. These general conditions contributed to the development of 
capitalism in a particular time and place, through the shifts in class forces brought about by the 
Black Death, the geopolitical milieu of Europe under Ottoman pressure, and the development of 
Atlantic colonial trade and slavery. These determinations provided an expanded non-Eurocentric 
geographical vantage point from which we outlined the development of capitalism, but one that 
was still nonetheless partial. A fuller exposition would have to account for determinations that 
arose from the histories of Africa, the subcontinent, and the ‘Far East’, among other places. 
Rather than closing off these empirical ‘gaps,’ we hope to have offered a theoretical framework 
that opens up such avenues for further research.  
We have also argued that these general conditions provided the appropriate historical 
context to telescope into – and in turn explain – the specificities of English development that led 
to the origins of capitalism. This has demonstrated how U&CD offers a theoretically 
sophisticated analysis of the particularities of development within a universal context thus adding 
empirical content to Karman Matin’s call for a theoretical ‘redeeming of the universal’.135 
U&CD’s usefulness is rooted in its ability to not only capture but also theorize the multiple 
mediations between the general and the particular. We suggest that this further furnishes and in 
many ways goes beyond the postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism. For in order to truly 
‘provincialize Europe’ we need an alternative non-Eurocentric lens afforded by a universal 
perspective such as U&CD that articulates rather than homogenizes particularity. In this lies the 
great challenge.  
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